Musculoskeletal injuries (MSIs) have long been a problem in general purpose forces, yet anecdotal evidence provided by medical, human performance, and training leadership suggests MSIs are also a readiness impediment to Special Operations Forces (SOF). The advanced tactical and physical requirements of SOF and fiscal implications, including direct medical costs and manpower, of training SOF highlight the importance of mitigating MSIs. **Purpose:** To describe the injury epidemiology of SOF utilizing self-reported injury histories. **Methods:** A total of 106 SOF were enrolled (Age: 31.7 ± 5.3 years, Height: 179.0 ± 5.5 cm, Mass: 85.9 ± 10.9 kg) as a part of a comprehensive biomechanical, musculoskeletal, physiological, and nutritional laboratory test protocol. Self-reported musculoskeletal injury data were collected for one year prior to the date of laboratory testing and filtered for total injuries and those with the potential to be preventable based on injury type, activity, and mechanism. **Results:** The frequency of MSIs was 24.5 injuries/100 subjects/year for total injuries and 18.9 injuries/100 subjects/year for preventable injuries. The incidence of MSIs was 20.8 injured subjects/100 subjects/year for total injuries and 16.0 injured subjects/100 subjects/year for preventable injuries. Preventable MSIs comprised 76.9% of total injuries. The knee and shoulder were the most common reported locations for total injuries (each 23.1%) and preventable injuries (each 25.0%). Preventable MSIs were classified as 60% acute, 35% chronic/overuse, and 5.0% other/unknown. Physical training (PT) was the most reported activity for total injuries (PT Command Organized: 46.2%, PT Non Command Organized: 7.7%, PT Unknown: 3.8%) and preventable injuries (PT Command Organized: 60.0%, PT Non Command Organized: 10.0%, PT Unknown: 5.0%). **Conclusions:** MSIs impede optimal physical readiness and tactical training in the SOF community. The data suggest that a significant proportion of MSIs are classified as preventable and may be mitigated with human performance programs.

Opinions, interpretations, conclusions, and recommendations are those of the author and not necessarily endorsed by the Department of Defense, US Army, or US Army Special Operations Command.

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